PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY
cod. 1011292

Academic year 2024/25
1° year of course - Second semester
Professor
Daniele MOLINARI
Academic discipline
Logica e filosofia della scienza (M-FIL/02)
Field
Istituzioni di filosofia
Type of training activity
Characterising
30 hours
of face-to-face activities
6 credits
hub: PARMA
course unit
in ENGLISH

Learning objectives

By the end of the course, students will be able to:

1. Understand the language and main debates within contemporary philosophy of imagination.

2. Take a position – and defend it through argumentation – on topics concerning the strengths and limits of various imaginative types.

3. Independently read and evaluate philosophical texts focused on the nature and dynamics of imagination.

Prerequisites

A good level of English in reading and writing is needed. The teacher will provide supporting materials and resources to facilitate the learning process.

Course unit content

Philosophy of Imagination. Topics include:
– Various notions of imagination in contemporary debates: propositional, sensory or objectual, experiential, creative ones.
– A unifying theory of imagination: the Simulation Theory.
– The case of aphantasia: an inability or difficulty in creating “mental images”.
– The epistemic value of imagination: is it possible to learn something through imagination?
Further details will be provided in the complete syllabus (see below).

Full programme

(More details will be provided during the semester)

What does it mean to “imagine”? Is this mental capacity tied to the creation of mental images, or does it extend into more linguistic settings? What are the distinctive characteristics of imagination, compared to other mental faculties (such as perception and belief)? What role does imagination play in the arts, science, and our daily lives? These questions will guide the course, where we will explore the realm of imagination in contemporary philosophy and its connections with psychology and philosophy of mind.

The course is divided into four main sections:

1. Philosophical Starting Points on Imagination
In this introduction, we will highlight some common traits of our imaginative activities. This will serve as a basis for the rest of the course (for instance, the distinction between solitary and collective imaginings, spontaneous and deliberate ones, occurrent and non-occurrent ones). We will also outline similarities and differences between imagination and other mental activities (such as conceiving and supposing), and explore the role of real objects involved in our imaginative projects.

2. Imagining with or without Images, Imagining Immersive or Detached Experiences
In this section we will explore the main notions of “imagination” within contemporary philosophical debates. We will start distinguishing between propositional and sensory imagination. While the former deals with counterfactual scenarios (exemplified by “what if..?” questions), the latter is traditionally tied to our capacity to form mental images. This will provide the appropriate context to analyze the notion of “aphantasia”, namely, the inability to create (or maintain) mental images. We will then explore notions more related to imagining experiences (“putting oneself in someone else’s shoes” or perspective-shifting) or creating relations of similarity between real objects.

3. A Unifying Theory of Imagination: Simulation Theory
This section will focus on the idea that imagination is a form of mental simulation, which can recreate past or hypothetical mental states. According to simulation theory, all our imaginings are recreated counterparts of primitive mental states – such as beliefs and perceptions. Unlike these, however, belief-like and perception-like imaginings do not guide our real-world actions. We will focus on the explanatory value of simulation theory in contexts such as mindreading and empathy, highlighting its strenghts and limits.

4. The Epistemic Value of Imagination
In the final part of the course, we will examine whether imagination can teach us something about the world, our languages and ourselves. For example, the history of science and philosophy is full of thought experiments – that is, fictional narratives employed to defend, critique, or illustrate a thesis. How can such an imaginative tool, without providing new empirical evidence, enhance our knowledge? What opportunities and risks lie in employing our most curious mental tool in scientific settings ?

Bibliography

*All texts will be provided for free by the teacher*

Arcangeli, M. (2023). Aphantasia Demystified, in Synthese, 201:31.

Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
(limited to chapters 1-2-3, pp. 7–70)

Dokic, J., & Arcangeli, M. (2015). The Heterogeneity of Experiential Imagination, in Open MIND, 11(T), pp. 1-20.

Goldie, P. (2011). Anti-Empathy, in Coplan, A., & Goldie, P. (Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (pp. 302–317). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kind, A. (2001). Putting the Image Back in Imagination, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(1), pp. 85–109.

Kind, A. (2023). Why We Need Imagination, in McLaughlin, B., & Cohen, J. (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition (pp. 570–587). Wiley-Blackwell.

Lorenzatti, J. J. (2023). Aphantasia: A Philosophical Approach, in Philosophical Psychology.

Nanay, B. (2023). Against Imagination, in McLaughlin, B., & Cohen, J. (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition (pp. 588–605). Wiley-Blackwell.

Salis, F. (2014). Imagination, in Braquinho, J., & Santos, R. (Eds.), Online Companion to Problems of Analytic Philosophy (pp. 1–18). Lisbon: Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon.

Salis, F., & Frigg, R. (2020). Capturing the Scientific Imagination, in Levy, A., & Godfrey-Smith, P. (Eds.), The Scientific Imagination (pp. 17–50). New York: Oxford University Press.

Walton, K. L. (1990). Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Harvard University Press.
(limited to sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, pp. 13–43).

Teaching methods

The course consists of lectures with activities designed to prompt discussion and the exchange of a plurality of ideas among participants. All reading materials will be provided by the teacher.

Assessment methods and criteria

For both attending and non-attending students, the final evaluation will be based on two elements: a written essay (topic to be agreed upon with the teacher) and an oral presentation/discussion of the essay. Both the essay and the discussion can be in English or Italian, according to the student’s preference.

Other information

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2030 agenda goals for sustainable development

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Contacts

Toll-free number

800 904 084

President of the degree course

Prof. Wolfgang Huemer
E. wolfgang.huemer@unipr.it

Faculty advisors

Prof. Roberto Pinzani
E. roberto.pinzani@unipr.it
Prof.ssa Irene Binini
E. irene.binini@unipr.it

Career guidance delegate

Prof. Andrea Bianchi
E. andreabianchi@unipr.it

Tutor Professors

Parma
Prof. Wolfgang Huemer

E. wolfgang.huemer@unipr.it

Ferrara
Prof. Matteo V. D'Alfonso  
E. matteovincenzo.dalfonso@unife.it

Modena e Reggio Emilia
Prof.ssa Annalisa Coliva 
E. annalisa.coliva@unimore.it

Erasmus delegates

Prof. Wolfgang Huemer
E. wolfgang.huemer@unipr.it
Prof. Italo Testa
E. italo.testa@unipr.it

Quality assurance delegate

Prof. Pierfrancesco Fiorato
E. pierfrancesco.fiorato@unipr.it

Internships

Parma
Prof. Gemmo Iocco

E. gemmo.iocco@unipr.it

Ferrara
Prof. Andrea Gatti

E. andrea.gatti@unife.it

Modena e Reggio Emilia
Prof. Giacomo Scarpelli

E. giacomo.scarpelli@unimore.it

Tutor students

Dott. ssa Leda Bonifai
E. leda.bonifai@studenti.unipr.it